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Fragility: The Next Wave in Critical Infrastructure Protection
Abstract
In North America today, we are about to embark on a significant effort to repair, or even
upgrade, many aspects of our infrastructure. Many of these efforts are linked to economic
recovery packages. Others are based on sheer need. The challenge for decision makers and
planners involves ensuring that scarce economic resources are put to their best use.
Understanding the concept of fragility plays a pivotal part in reaching that
understanding.Fragility, like many other systems—particularly Information Technology (IT )
systems—works on the concept of subjects and objects. Subjects are those entities that
seek to exploit the services (or capacity) offered by the object. Objects, on the other hand,
are those entities that deliver some good or service to the overall system. Of course,
something may act as the object in one pairing and the subject in another pairing—they are
not exclusive in nature.
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In North America today, we are about to embark on a significant effort
to repair, or even upgrade, many aspects of our infrastructure. Many of
these efforts are linked to economic recovery packages. Others are based
on sheer need. The challenge for decision makers and planners involves
ensuring that scarce economic resources are put to their best use.
Understanding the concept of fragility plays a pivotal part in reaching
that understanding.
Fragility, like many other systems—particularly Information Technology
(IT) systems—works on the concept of subjects and objects. Subjects are
those entities that seek to exploit the services (or capacity) offered by the
object. Objects, on the other hand, are those entities that deliver some
good or service to the overall system. Of course, something may act as
the object in one pairing and the subject in another pairing—they are not
exclusive in nature. For example, the driver of a car may be considered
the subject in the relationship between the driver and the car, while
the car is considered the object. The car may become the subject when
looking at the relationship between the car and a bridge, insofar as the
car (subject) is now exploiting a service that the bridge (object) provides,
namely, getting the car from Point A to Point B.
Subjects and objects can be measured using a consistent framework.
The subject is measured in terms of the demand that it puts on the
overall system, and these measurements are contextual. If the need
for more space is the core issue, then the measurement system for the
subject will likely seek to quantify how much space is required as its
core criterion. If the issue rotates around the number of transactions
per unit of time, the subject will likely be measured in terms of how long
it takes to process a single transaction. Objects, on the other hand, are
measured based upon the capacity that they deliver into the system.
Object measurements will generally focus on the performance of the
object and how it relates to the demands placed on it by all the subjects
that seek to exploit its services.
The chance that the object will fail in terms of its relationship to the
subject can be viewed in terms of three perspectives. The first, referred
to as designed fragility can trace its roots to reliability engineering. The
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engineer designs something so that it can be assured to work, given certain
stringent conditions, a certain percentage of the time. Naturally, the more
grave the impact associated with failure (both in terms of consequence
and potential liability), the greater the assurance will need to be—and the
lower the level of designed fragility. One might even express this in terms
of fragility being the difference between all possible outcomes and those
that the engineer can assure will be positive outcomes (F = 100 − R).
The reliability of the infrastructure can change as operating c onditions
change. The engineer has assured the reliability of the i nfrastructure
based on certain operating conditions. Where the infrastructure is
operating outside of those conditions, the engineer makes no such
promises. Operating conditions may include factors such as temperature,
humidity, chemical exposure, age, and so on. For those that have looked
at Safety Management Systems, this concept will be reasonably familiar
as the gradual operation of equipment outside of acceptable parameters
is generally accepted as increasing the risk of failure and, consequently,
hazard to the operator and those nearby. This natural fragility reflects
the conditions present in the real world as opposed to the engineering
environment.
The conditions that impact natural fragility can be episodic in nature.
Seasons change as do daily conditions. Hence, cyclical fragility describes
natural fragility and its behavior over periods of time. Not all natural
fragility will operate in cycles; sometimes the fragility is more linear in
nature. Natural fragility is defined in terms of two elements. First, there
is the change in natural fragility that happens along a curve over time.
At particular times on the curve, certain conditions may be more
prevalent and, as a result, the overall fragility of the system may e ither
suffer or improve. The second element is the wear and tear on the
infrastructure as it is subjected to repeated strains. Imagine a cycle of
freezing and thawing water. As the water freezes, it expands, p
 utting
pressure on things around it, like the sides of a container. As the
temperature rises, however, the ice melts, leaving an empty spot that can
be filled with a larger amount of water.
The following rules extend from the relationship of subjects and objects.
The following rules might be called the local fragility rules:
● The design fragility of an object is the difference between the total
population of outcomes less those that assured through the
engineering associated with the system (F = 100 − R).
● The natural fragility of an object can be described as either
the lowest number of desirable outcomes or where
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Fragility(design) × Factor(environmental impact). This can also be described in terms
of Fragility (natural) = Fragility(design) × Factor(loss of effectiveness due to environment).
● The cyclical fragility of an object can be described in terms of the
curve defined by the maximum natural fragility over a period of time
where the conditions associated with the natural fragility repeat
themselves.
From a physical infrastructure perspective, these rules have two
significant impacts. The first is that it is not enough for the a
 sset
protection specialist to calculate impact simply based upon the
engineering specifications of the target (the object). In short, a more
comprehensive, intelligent assessment of the infrastructure will need
to be made to account for fragility. The core challenge here will be
identifying the knowledge sets that apply to the infrastructure and then
building the capacity of the assessor or, in some cases, the assessment
team. The second element is that this requires much more awareness
regarding the impacts of decisions and how those decisions will affect the
infrastructure. If we change the conditions that surround the object, we
have to understand how that will change the object and whether or not
this will have an impact on how the subject and the object relate. This
will be a core c hallenge for planners as it would necessitate maintaining
running inventories of their infrastructure points and understanding how
their decisions would affect those on categorical, if not individual, levels.
Understanding the relationship between these concepts is vital to the
understanding of how fragility works at the local level. The local level,
sometimes referred to as the tactical level, is the foundation of the
strategic infrastructure system at the regional and even national level.
This consideration is often neglected when one becomes preoccupied
with the protection of the local facility. What needs to be understood
and accounted for is how the local facility or infrastructure contributes
to the overall performance of the system.
Recall that the concept of capacity and demand was touched upon earlier
in the description of the subject (demanding services) and the object
(delivering capacity). In a system operating at full capacity, these two
elements exist in a delicate balance that cannot be disrupted without
causing some level of disruption (D = C). Where the capacity of the
system exceeds the demands placed on it and depending upon the
configuration of the network, the redundancy of the system allows
the system to respond to some kinds of disruption by simply rerouting
to new routes and locations where there is surplus capacity available
(D < C). On the other hand, where there is more demand than capacity
(C > D), a situation exists where not all subjects’ demands can be met.
93
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At that point, the subject must either reroute itself (to find a new source
of capacity), remove itself from the system, or become idle within the
system. We have all seen this situation arise during traffic jams.
The balance of demand and capacity will determine what state subjects
can remain at within the overall system. When the objects are adequately
meeting demands, the subjects will continue to carry on through the
system or continue to remain active until they have reached or achieved
their ultimate goals. A subject can be described as being in an active state
when the subject is continuing to attempt to exploit capacity. Subjects
caught in a situation where there is no capacity to be exploited will
find themselves entering a neutral or passive state. In this context, the
subject is waiting for some surplus capacity so that it can be exploited.
What needs to be clear, however, is that the passive subject is occupying
capacity (as opposed to just space) within the system.
Let us apply these principles and concepts to a more concrete example—
the surface network for the City of Ottawa, Canada. In this context, let us
assume that the surface system in any given area can handle 1000 cars
per minute on the highway and 100 cars per minute in the downtown
core. Where there is one driver per car, then one might assume that
the two aspects of the system can handle 1000 drivers and 100 drivers
respectively. When there are 500 cars on the highway, there are 500 cars
worth of capacity to be exploited. The system can continue to function
and the cars remain active, occasionally changing lanes to exploit areas
that appear to have more capacity. When there are 1000 cars o
 perating
in the system, the system is operating at capacity. Any new vehicle
attempting to enter the system may cause another vehicle already in
the system to slow, or even stop, meaning that the system quickly stalls
behind the blockage. If, as the result of the introduction of this a
 dditional
vehicle, an accident occurs, then many more subjects in the system
become inactive, essentially entering a passive state. This passive state
occupies more and more capacity (as defined in terms of space), until the
subjects have taken up all the available capacity and the system begins
to stall. Where this becomes even more challenging is when the subjects
occupy an object, move into a passive state and then force the object to
enter a passive state. This begins to approach the challenges associated
with gridlock that occurs when vehicles simply have no alternatives or
capacity to exploit, fill up the overall grid, and then become the
disruption themselves.
Now consider a system that has the capacity to handle 4000 persons
traveling down a particular route. Let’s assume a case where c arpooling
means that four persons occupy one vehicle. This means that the o
 verall
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ratio of persons to cars has increased to four to one. Mass transit, such
as busses, increases this ratio again, but on two fronts. The bus can
handle forty persons. On the other hand, a bus only requires the space
of approximately four vehicles. First, the ratio of passengers (subjects)
to the bus (object) has increased to forty to one. This does not reflect the
true value, however, because the bus takes up more than a car’s allocated
space—it takes up approximately four times that amount. That means
that the space allocated would normally hold four cars and, therefore,
sixteen persons. The bottom line conclusion is that the mass transit
system has improved the system’s capacity by approximately six cars
(forty minus sixteen split with four persons per vehicle). In short, the bus
has shifted the ratio of subjects to objects, creating a condition by which
many can exploit a single entity in the overall system.
As a result of this analysis, we can apply certain rules when looking
at the interaction between subjects and objects. These are the
following:
● Chaining Sequence Rule—Given Subject A: Object B and Subject B:
Object C, then where Object B and Subject B are the same entity, one
can infer Subject A: Object C.
● Efficiency Rule—The efficiency of a system can be improved by
increasing the Subject: Object.
At the regional level, the relationship between the subject and the object
has a logical limit. This limit is based on the maximum efficiency of
the subject and nature of the object. Consider the bus example. In this
example, we have increased the efficiency of the subject from one to
four (carpooling) to ten (the bus—forty in the space of four). We have
not changed the nature of the object—it can still only handle a certain
number of transactions per unit of time (4000 cars per route). In this
case, the subject (bus) has become more efficient, but the ratio between
the subjects (cars) to the object has not improved.
This situation leads to a condition where the capacity of the system
gradually becomes fragile. This is because the system cannot respond
effectively to the loss of the efficiency within the system. When looking
at our example in Ottawa, we have to consider an aspect of cyclic fragility
that occurred as part of the labor negotiation cycle. In D
 ecember 2008,
the object failed when the union went on strike, e ssentially d
 ropping the
value of the subject from forty persons/four cars or ten p
 ersons per car
down to four units in a single car. In essence, a
 pproximately twenty-four
person-trips worth of demand were suddenly forced back into the system,
the equivalent of six cars per bus lost.
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The result of this impact depends upon two functions. The first f unction
is how the system can adjust its rate of performance in response to the
new demand. In this case, the surface road system is not something
that one can add capacity (infrastructure) quickly—it takes time to
build roads. With respect to the amount of infrastructure available, the
transportation system follows physically fixed routes that are necessary
to the operation of the mode of conveyance. The question is not, however,
about whether or not new routes can be created, but whether or not they
can be adequately controlled. Additional flexibility could also be inputted
to the transportation system (to an extent) in the context of aviation and
marine industries, thereby altering the nature of the system. In essence,
the first function describes the ability of the network to create and add
capacity within the system so that the system can rebalance itself, which
is a pure resiliency function.
Where the first function cannot be achieved, the second function must
come into play. The second function is the attempt to locate and reroute
the demand that is not being met into other avenues that offer a surplus
of capacity. This may involve alternate routes, the use of side streets,
and a host of other means—the important part is that the i nfrastructure
has untapped capacity and can direct disrupted demand onto that
capacity. This premise is also not new; it is the foundation of Intelligent
Transportation Systems that attempt to route around traffic jams, etc.
Where the system cannot achieve these two goals, however, the next layer
of fragility comes into play. This fragility is based upon the f ragmentation
and potential dissolution of networks. Consider that when a node or a
conduit is completely filled (demand meets or exceeds capacity), then it
cannot deliver any more service. These are essentially pockets within the
system and, depending on what capacity they offer to the system, one
will find that the impact begins to cascade upstream (where the system
becomes clogged) and downstream (where the expected resources and so
on fail to arrive). This is common within the airline industry, particularly
during bad weather, and one only has to look at a major hub during that
bad weather to see the breadth and depth of the impact.
This impact is again based upon the capacity at the disrupted points and
the connections between the various nodes. When the nodes are affected,
the conduits between those nodes are all affected, following the same
principles as a single point of failure from the Business Continuity domain.
When only one of many conduits between nodes is affected, the system may
be able to adjust accordingly (such as we would see where aircraft and ships
are routed to new airways or shipping lanes in response to bad weather).
What should be clear to the reader, however, is that there is a level of
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dependence and independence in how this impact operates. If the node
is configured with set points and does not have the ability to reprioritize
or adjust its own configuration (such as paid gates at an airport); then
the individual lines or conduits of disruption function independently of
each other. This results in a condition where the sum of disruptions must
be taken into account. On the other hand, where a node has the ability to
adjust and prioritize accordingly, then the calculation of disruption moves
much more in line with those associated with dependent events.
Consider this example; if each service point held by the node is firmly
and irrevocably allocated to one family of lines, then only those s ervice
points need to be disrupted for the whole family of lines to be d
 isrupted.
If, however, there are clauses and similar mechanisms built in that
allow for the organization to move a disrupted line from one f amily
into another group of service points (likely with a cost), then the fi
 nal
failure of the event is not determined by whether or not all of one
administrative group of service points are disrupted. At the tactical level,
the organization needs to arrange its service points and its contracts
to prevent a single incident from affecting all service lines to allow for
flexibility in its o
 perational context.
Fragility, at this point, indicates the potential for fragmentation and we
must, therefore, take into account the risk of disruption looking at both
the infrastructure side of the equation and also the administrative side
of the equation. Where all elements are vulnerable to a certain kind of
attack, for instance, and there are no other options available, then the
system is fragile. At the regional level, if there is only one option available
that can meet all services, this local or tactical fragility can quickly affect
the regional fragility—meaning that the regional system is vulnerable to
a single attack at a certain point.
Finally, by looking at how the capacity lost as a result of that disruption
affects the overall system—movement to and through—we can calculate
the disruptions due to fragmentation and dissolution. Fragmentation
occurs at key points that segregate or connect the various nodes of a
network. These might be referred to as the hubs in the t ransportation
system. Depending upon whether or not the physical, procedural,
technical, and psychological measures are in place to connect behind
those nodes (such as a couple of airports with the correct runways,
landing systems, communications systems, trained personnel, etc), the
system will cut away from the network. This leads to fragmentation.
Fragmentation and its associated impacts eventually lead to a situation
where demand in the system cannot locate any reasonable route by which
97
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it can accomplish its goals. When this happens, the system gradually fills
and then collapses under its own weight. Essentially, it is overwhelmed
by a shift in the demand to capacity ratio. The end result is a condition
where the pressure in the system has to be relieved to such a point that
it can restart its operations and generate the capacity necessary to meet
demand.
Fragility, in a networked transportation system operates across all
three levels: local, regional, and national or strategic. The strategic and
regional levels are founded upon the capacity and vulnerabilities inherent
at the local levels and then exacerbated through regional and national
disconnects, the lack of redundancy, and similar factors. At the local
level, an understanding of fragility must be combined with the need to
conduct appropriate impact assessments in addition to u
 nderstanding
the vulnerabilities associated with each input that allows for work to
proceed so that the potential capacity to be delivered can actually be
communicated or delivered into the system. Failing to understand the
concept of fragility at the local level can lead to a misinterpretation of
impacts by failing to understand how the infrastructure delivers capacity
within in the broader regional or national context.
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